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THE STRUCTURE OF TERRORISM THREATS 
AND THE LAWS OF WAR 
MATTHEW C. WAXMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
The threats of transnational terrorist networks in recent years have 
prompted calls for reexamining the law of war and its application to non-
state entities.1 The challenge of fitting counterterrorist operations—and the 
acts of terroristic individuals or entities themselves—into existing legal 
frameworks predates the September 11, 2001 attacks,2 but the globe-
spanning nature of the al Qaeda threat has raised the level of complexity 
and the stakes involved. Some states, forced to act quickly to respond to 
twenty-first century escalation of attacks and meet emerging threats, have 
struggled to fit their actions into the international law of armed conflict.3 
 
 * Associate Professor, Columbia Law School; Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign 
Relations; Member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law. I thank the 
following individuals for their helpful comments and critiques of drafts of this paper: Gabriella Blum, 
Ashley Deeks, Joshua Geltzer, Monica Hakimi, Yuval Shany, Ganesh Sitaraman, Jessica Stern, and 
Sidharth Velamoor. I thank Adam Klein for his superb research assistance.  
 1. See, e.g., John Bellinger, Legal Advisor to the U.S. Sec’y of State, Legal Issues in the War on 
Terrorism, Address Before the London School of Economics (Oct. 31, 2006), in 8 GERMAN L.J. 735, 
736 (2007) (raising the question of “whether the existing legal frameworks contained in the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and domestic criminal laws are well-suited to deal with international terrorism in 
the 21st century.”); Anthony Dworkin, Beyond the “War on Terror”: Towards a New Transatlantic 
Framework for Counterterrorism, 13 EUR. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. 1 (2009). 
 2. See W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of 
Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 525, 528 (2006); Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, 
and the National Defense, Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law (May 4, 1989), 
in 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 93 (1989) (“[T]he inherent right of self defense potentially applies against any 
illegal use of force, and that it extends to any group or State that can properly be regarded as 
responsible for such activities.”). 
 3. See Memorandum from George W. Bush on Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda 
Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/ 
bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf (considering applicability of Geneva Conventions to conflicts against 
the Taliban and al Qaeda); Barak Ravid & Anshel Pfeffer, Government Looking to Set Int’l Rules for 
Fighting Terror, HAARETZ, Oct. 22, 2009, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/ 
1122546.html (describing incipient Israeli initiative to “see the laws governing warfare adjusted to 
combating terrorism.”); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, “The 
Obama Administration and International Law, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society 
of International Law, Washington, D.C., March 25, 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/ 
s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm [hereinafter Koh Remarks] (“In the conflict occurring in Afghanistan 
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Legal academics have embraced this challenge as well. Some have 
considered the question in view of the nature and purposes of the 
international law of armed conflict,4 while others have emphasized broader 
changes in the international order.5 
Most legal debate has focused on the degree to which transnational 
terrorism does or does not resemble military and national security threats 
posed by state or localized guerrilla armies. Proponents of applying the law 
of armed conflict argue that modern terrorist organizations wage violence 
at a magnitude or sophistication previously achievable only by states or 
within local areas. Proponents of adapting the law of armed conflict argue 
that its basic principles fit contemporary circumstances reasonably well but 
that its specific rules should be modified. Opponents of adapting the law of 
armed conflict counter that the traditional law of armed conflict is adequate 
to regulate the use of force against terrorist organizations and fear that 
efforts at “revision” may provide intellectual cover for backsliding of 
humanitarian and liberty protections.6 And opponents of even applying the 
 
and elsewhere, we continue to fight the perpetrators of 9/11: a nonstate actor, al Qaeda (as well s the 
Taliban forces that harbored al Qaeda).”). 
 4. See, e.g., Amos Guiora, Targeted Killing as Active Self-Defense, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 
319, 323-24 (2004) ( “[Self-defense standards were] originally intended to apply to war and peace 
between recognized States; the concept of non-State actors was not contemplated . . . . [T]he concept of 
active self-defense could be a natural starting point for developing this ‘new regime.’”); Eric A. Posner, 
Terrorism and the Laws of War, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 423 (2004-05) (emphasizing reciprocity rationales for 
adherence to jus in bello and arguing that these are not present in conflicts against nonstate terrorist 
organizations). 
 5. See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the 
Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 755-60 (2004-05) (advocating “a 
modernized law of armed conflict”); David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Supsected Terrorists: Extra-
Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 171 (2005) (advocating a 
“mixed model” combining the law of armed conflict and international human rights law); Roy S. 
Schöndorf, Extra-State Armed Conflicts: Is There a Need for a New Legal Regime?, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L 
LAW & POL. 1, (2004) (arguing for a new legal category of armed conflict that can accommodate the 
issues arising from extra-state armed conflicts); Robert D. Sloane, Prologue to a Voluntarist War 
Convention, 106 MICH. L. REV. 443 (2007-08) (arguing that present regimes governing internal and 
international armed conflict should be augmented by a “voluntarist war convention”); Jane E. 
Stromseth, New Paradigms for the Jus Ad Bellum?, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 561, 567-68 (2006) 
(“[T]he meaning of ‘imminent’ attack that is central to accepted understandings of anticipatory self-
defense needs greater clarification in the context of terrorism . . . .”); John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 729, 749-50 (2004) (questioning whether international legal doctrine will constrain states’ 
use of force against terrorist threats). 
 6. See, e.g., Deborah N. Pearlstein, Avoiding an International Law Fix for Terrorist Detention, 
41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 663 (2008) (considering reasons why international law should not be applied in 
current U.S. terrorist-detention situations); Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International 
Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the “War on Terror”, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55, 57 (2003) 
(“[T]o conclude that humanitarian law cannot accommodate terrorism and the efforts to combat it when 
these phenomena amount to armed conflict (the very circumstance that humanitarian law is meant to 
address) would be wrong.”). 
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law of armed conflict at all argue that contemporary terrorism threats are 
insufficiently analogous to military threats to merit its application.7 
Where this debate, about whether and how the law of armed conflict 
might warrant adaptation, has fallen short is in its insufficient integration of 
analytical developments within the counter-terrorism community. This 
includes both intelligence assessment and relevant specialized social 
sciences.8 Legal debate has tended to rely on a snapshot view of terrorism, 
or to speak in terms of “terrorist threats” as a monolithic category. This 
debate often fails to consider diverse sub-categories of actors and how 
terrorism or other non-state threats of tomorrow may look very different 
from those of yesterday and today. United States government rhetoric may 
be partly to blame for the conceptual haziness inherent in references to 
“terrorist groups,” “terrorism,” or even just “terror” as an undifferentiated 
policy construct. 
This article considers a major debate in the American and European 
counterterrorism analytic community—whether the primary terrorist threat 
to the West is posed by hierarchical, centralized terrorist organizations 
operating from geographic safe havens, or by radicalized individuals 
conducting a loosely organized, ideologically common but operationally 
independent fight against western societies—and this debate’s implications 
for the law of armed conflict. 
While the broad consensus is that both phenomena are of great 
concern and not neatly separable, each view of the main terrorism threat to 
Western developed states poses a different set of challenges to current law 
of war models. If the main terrorist threat to the United States and its 
European allies reflects the former, “top-down” model, then existing law of 
war principles are a useful starting point, and with modest reform may be 
adapted to combating international terrorist organizations.9 If the main 
terrorist threat resembles the latter, “bottom-up” model, existing law of war 
principles have much less to offer, and according to many proponents of 
that model their application is likely to be strategically counterproductive.10 
And if both threats exist side by side or overlap, requiring application of 
 
 7. This is not an exhaustive list of major positions in the debate. For example, a “middle” 
position is that states should apply the law of armed conflict only in locales where the sustained level of 
violence is sufficient to meet an armed conflict standard and should apply criminal law where it is not. 
 8. Cf. Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of War, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 1745, 1747 (2009) (“[D]espite counterinsurgency’s ubiquity in military and policy circles, legal 
scholars have almost completely ignored it.”). 
 9. See infra Part I (considering the evolution of the terrorist threat). 
 10. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (discussing how aggregation of extremist groups 
may be counterproductive). 
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separate legal paradigms, then legal debates will need to focus on where the 
lines between them should be drawn. 
An important caveat is that this examination is modestly limited to 
terrorist threats to developed Western countries, particularly in Europe and 
the United States, given the intense transatlantic debate about the legal 
propriety of “war” authorities.11 It does not address, for example, local 
insurgencies and geographically confined terrorist organizations such as 
those that operate in South or Southeast Asia, though some of the insights 
are applicable to those cases, too. It is also limited to discussion of law of 
armed conflict approaches to regulating counterterrorism, putting aside the 
very large school of thought that criminal law enforcement is the more 
legally and strategically appropriate response.12 A persuasive case might be 
made that the difficulties and dangers of regulating counter-terrorism 
operations with the law of armed conflict, rather than criminal law, favor a 
policing and law enforcement approach to the entire problem. This paper 
does not deal with that important debate. 
As a step toward informing that debate, however, this article 
encourages legal scholarship to engage more directly with social science 
research on terrorism in guiding analysis of legal questions related to armed 
force. In doing so, it advances two overarching arguments, applicable to 
both jus ad bellum (law related to going to war) and jus in bello (law 
related to the conduct of war). First, to the extent changes in the strategic 
environment drive changes in the law, the emerging organizational 
structures of terrorism threats will partially determine future legal 
trajectories. Analysis of how the law of armed conflict might be evolving to 
deal with terrorism should engage in more nuanced and sophisticated 
examination of how terrorism threats are themselves evolving. Second, 
normatively, the merits of legal reform proposals depend heavily on the 
capacity of those proposals to meet strategic needs while protecting 
humanitarian, liberty, and conflict-resolution interests. That capacity, in 
turn, depends on how well the assumptions underlying those proposals 
track accurately the anticipated—but uncertain—future terrorism threat 
environment. 
 
 11. See Matthew C. Waxman, Fighting al-Qaeda: The Continuing Transatlantic Divide, 51 
SURVIVAL 61, 64-65 (2009) [hereinafter Waxman, Fighting al-Qaeda]. 
 12. See, e.g., THE EMINENT JURISTS PANEL ON TERRORISM, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS, INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, ASSESSING DAMAGE, URGING ACTION (2009), available at http:// 
www.icj.org/dwn/database/EJP-Report.pdf. 
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I. TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP THREATS 
Debate rages in the counterterrorism and social and political science 
communities about the evolution of the terrorist threat.13 While it is widely 
accepted that each camp has something important to contribute to the 
debate14—and while the following descriptions are cursory summaries of 
complex positions—these characterizations nonetheless provide useful 
lenses through which to consider how divergent views of the terrorist threat 
affect legal analysis of terrorism and the law of armed conflict. 
Some experts assess that the primary terrorist threat to the United 
States and other developed states will come from al Qaeda and other 
similar terrorist organizations: hierarchical organizations functioning 
according to some centralized control and with significant operating bases 
and leadership cores supporting activities abroad.15 This view is supported 
by historical accounts of al Qaeda’s rise to become arguably the most 
powerful terrorist organization in history, which emphasize its 
sophisticated organization and dependence on territorial safe havens.16 
Centralized leadership and hierarchical organization enable an organization 
 
 13. See Elaine Sciolino & Eric Schmitt, A Not Very Private Feud over Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 8, 2008 (describing debate between respected counterterrorism experts Bruce Hoffman of 
Georgetown University and Marc Sageman of the Foreign Policy Research Institute), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/08/weekinreview/08sciolino.html; see also Joshua Alexander Geltzer, 
Six Rather Unexplored Assumptions About al-Qaeda, 1 CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 393, 398-99 
(2008) (discussing strategic versus social perspectives in studying terrorism); see generally SOCIAL 
SCIENCE FOR COUNTERTERRORISM: PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER (Paul K. Davis & Kim Cragin, 
eds., 2009) (surveying current social science research related to strengths, weaknesses, organization, 
and strategies of terrorist groups). 
 14. See Peter Bergen, Al Qaeda at 20 Dead or Alive?, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2008, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/15/AR2008081502981.html (quoting 
former NYPD and CIA official Michael Sheehan who notes that the combination of both phenomena—
local “hotheads” and training from “al-Qaeda central”—creates the most lethal terrorist threat); Peter 
Bergen, Does Osama bin Laden Still Matter?, TIME, July 2, 2008, available at http:// 
www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1819903,00.html (“[T]here is a very clear, almost 
mathematical increase in lethality as soon as plotters touch the [Federally Administered Tribal Areas]”) 
(quoting former CIA official Philip Mudd). 
 15. See Bruce Hoffman, Al-Qaeda Dangerous as Ever, THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Sept. 10, 2008, 
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=19846; Bruce Hoffman, The Myth of Grass-Roots 
Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 133 (2008) [hereinafter Hoffman, 
Myth]; Michael Leiter, Dir., Nat’l Counter Terrorism Ctr., Eight Years After 9/11: Confronting the 
Terrorist Threat to the Homeland, Hearing Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee 2 (Sept. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Eight Years After 9/11] (stating that “al-Qa‘ida’s 
core in Pakistan represent[s] the most dangerous component of the larger al-Qa‘ida network.”). 
 16. For historical accounts, see generally DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE AGE OF 
SACRED TERROR: RADICAL ISLAM’S WAR AGAINST AMERICA (2003); STEVE COLL, GHOST WARS: THE 
SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND BIN LADEN, FROM THE SOVIET INVASION TO 
SEPTEMBER 10, 2001 (2004); LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL-QAEDA AND THE ROAD 
TO 9/11 (2006). 
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to conduct the type of coordinated attacks that have the greatest lethality 
and political impact.17 The centrality of terrorist sanctuaries is an especially 
important corollary to the “top-down” view of the terrorist threat,18 and it 
has weighty implications for U.S. and allied foreign policy, because it 
suggests that neutralizing those sanctuaries significantly degrades terrorist 
threats.19 
Proponents of this assessment emphasize that al Qaeda remains a 
highly potent enemy,20 especially because of its continued ability to find 
sanctuary along the Afghanistan–Pakistan  border. To those who hold this 
view, the December 2009 attempted bombing by a Nigerian citizen aboard 
a transatlantic airline flight, allegedly orchestrated by operatives of al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, resembles 9/11 more closely than a 
“homegrown terrorist” attack.21 
 
 17. See Lydia Khalil, Op-Ed., The Threat of Homegrown Terrorism, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 27, 
2009, available at http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/10/27/ 
the_threat_of_homegrown_terrorism/ (acknowledging threat of homegrown terrorism but concluding 
that al Qaeda “and its affiliate organizations,” because of their ability to implement “sophisticated, 
coordinated attacks,” remain the greatest terrorism threat to the United States). 
 18. Hoffman, Myth, supra note 15, at 134-36, 138; Eight Years After 9/11, supra note 15, at 2 
(“al-Qa‘ida’s core in Pakistan represent[s] the most dangerous component of the larger al-Qa‘ida 
network”). 
 19. See Dennis C. Blair, Dir., Nat’l Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence 
Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 4 (Feb. 12, 2009), available at 
http://intelligence.senate.gov/090212/blair.pdf (“Sustained pressure against al-Qa’ida in . . . [Pakistan’s 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas] has the potential to further degrade its organizational cohesion 
and diminish the threat it poses.”); NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NAT’L INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: 
THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND (2007) (“Al-Qa’ida is and will remain the most 
serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots . . . 
. [It] has protected or regenerated [its] . . . safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership.”); Bruce Riedel, Armageddon in 
Islamabad, NAT’L INT., June 23, 2009, available at http://www.nationalinterest.org/ 
Article.aspx?id=21644 (“The damage that could be wrought [by a militant Islamist sanctuary in 
Pakistan] is many magnitudes greater than the capabilities lent to al-Qaeda through having a safe haven 
in Afghanistan.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Peter Bergen, Al Qaeda, the Organization: A Five-Year Forecast, NEW AM. FOUND., 
July 2008, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/al_qaeda_organization_five_year 
_forecast_7879 (“The conventional wisdom is that al Qaeda, the organization, has been largely 
destroyed, replaced by an ideological movement and a new generation of ‘homegrown’ terrorists 
implementing attacks such as the 2004 Madrid bombings that killed 191 people. While the rapid spread 
of the al Qaeda ideological virus in the past several years should be cause for considerable concern, it 
would be wrong to conclude that the central al Qaeda organization is no longer a threat.”). But see 
Thomas Rid & Marc Hecker, The Terror Fringe, 158 POL’Y REV. 3, 17 (Dec. 2009-Jan. 2010), 
available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/71912517.html (“Will success in the 
Afghan-Pakistan badlands, however defined and however unlikely in the midterm future, end the 
radicalization of extremists elsewhere and stop global terrorism? Very unlikely.”). 
 21. Eric Schmitt & Eric Lipton, Officials Point to Suspect’s Claim of Qaeda Ties in Yemen, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/27/us/27terror.html; Richard 
Esposito & Brian Ross, Investigators: Northwest Bomb Plot Planned by al Qaeda in Yemen, ABC 
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Other terrorism experts see the highly centralized, “core” al Qaeda as 
sui generis and substantially weakened; they see future terrorist threats as 
likely to be homegrown and decentralized, inspired by movements abroad 
but not controlled or significantly supported from abroad.22 One of this 
view’s best-known advocates, Marc Sageman, believes that “al Qaeda in 
the West has been on the decline since its apogee of 2001.”23 Sageman 
argues that while homegrown terrorists may be ideologically inspired by 
core al Qaeda, the latter’s offensive capacities have been largely blunted, 
and independent operators have surpassed al Qaeda and its affiliates in 
terms of number of attacks perpetrated in the West. He recently testified 
that: 
78% of all global neo-jihadi terrorist plots in the West in the past five 
years came from autonomous homegrown groups without any 
connection, direction or control from al Qaeda Core or its 
allies. . . .The paucity of actual al Qaeda and other transnational 
terrorist organization plots compared to the number of autonomous 
plots refutes the claims by some heads of the Intelligence 
Community . . . that all Islamist plots in the West can be traced back to 
the Afghan Pakistani border.24 
Most observers and participants in the top-down/bottom-up debate 
recognize that these competing perspectives reflect two relevant aspects of 
the terrorist threat rather than mutually exclusive visions.25 They are 
perspectives along a continuum, not binary alternatives. Al Qaeda or 
virtually any non-state threat is, at any given moment, a hybrid 
 
NEWS, Dec. 26, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/northwest-bomb-plot-planned-al-qaeda-
yemen/story?id=9426085. 
 22. See Marc Sageman, Does Obama Still Call the Shots?: Debating the Containment of al 
Qaeda’s Leadership, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 163, 163-64 (2008) (responding to Hoffman’s critique of 
Sageman’s assertions in LEADERLESS JIHAD: TERROR NETWORKS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY); 
see also JESSICA STERN, TERROR IN THE NAME OF GOD: WHY RELIGIOUS MILITANTS KILL 237-80 
(2004) (considering decentralized terrorist organizational structures). See generally MARC SAGEMAN, 
LEADERLESS JIHAD: TERROR NETWORKS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2008) [hereinafter 
LEADERLESS JIHAD]. 
 23. Dr. Marc Sageman, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Inst., Confronting al-Qaeda: 
Understanding the Threat in Afghanistan and Beyond, Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee 6 (Oct. 7, 2009), available at http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/ 
2009/SagemanTestimony091007p.pdf. 
 24. Id. at 6-7 (referring to statements by former CIA Dir. Michael Hayden). Within al Qaeda 
itself, prominent strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri also purportedly favored a decentralized approach to 
jihad over hierarchical, top-down organizations, which had proved too easy for counterterrorism 
authorities to dismantle. See BRYNJAR LIA, ARCHITECT OF GLOBAL JIHAD: THE LIFE OF AL-QAIDA 
STRATEGIST ABU MUS‘AB AL-SURI 352 (2008). 
 25. See e.g., ASSAF MOGHADAM, THE GLOBALIZATION OF MARTYRDOM: AL QAEDA, SALAFI 
JIHAD, AND THE DIFFUSION OF SUICIDE ATTACKS (2008). 
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incorporating elements of both models, and the relative weight of top-down 
and bottom-up features in this mixture may vary as operational conditions 
change. As Martha Crenshaw has explained: 
Al-Qa’ida has always been an organization that depended as much on 
local initiative as on top-down direction, and in the aftermath of 9/11 it 
has dispersed even more. Its complex organizational structure is 
something between a centralized hierarchy and a decentralized flat 
network. It is a flexible and adaptable organization that has survived 
well beyond the lifespan of most other terrorist organizations.26 
Recently, for example, al Qaeda has tended to rely on affiliate 
organizations dispersed across several continents—al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula, Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan, al-Shabab in Somalia—to provide 
financial, technical and other forms of support to local “franchises.”27 Some 
small groups of suspected terrorists in recent plots, even if not formally part 
of or taking orders from al Qaeda, appear to have received some inspiration 
and training support from al Qaeda agents or close allies. 28 
The top-down versus bottom-up debate may be partially attributable to 
the different threat profiles facing the United States and Europe,29 with 
Americans generally more worried about another 9/11-style attack 
masterminded by core al Qaeda and Europeans generally perceiving a 
greater threat from homegrown terrorism.30 These different terrorism threat 
perceptions on the part of the United States and its European allies help 
explain why the United States has characterized the fight against al Qaeda 
 
 26. Martha Crenshaw, Ctr. for Int’l Sec. & Cooperation, Stanford Univ., Reassessing the Evolving 
al-Qa’ida Threat to the Homeland,Statement to the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, 
and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Committee on Homeland Security, 1 (Nov. 19, 2009), available at 
http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20091119111255-63126.pdf. 
 27. See Under Pressure, Al-Qaida Reaches Out to Affiliates (NPR radio broadcast Jan. 11, 2010), 
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122436089. 
 28. See e.g., David Von Drehle & Bobby Ghosh, An Enemy Within: The Making of Najibullah 
Zazi, TIME, Oct. 12, 2009, at 24 (“Zazi suggests that the network of Osama bin Laden, weakened 
though it might be, can still project violence into the U.S.”). It is alleged that two of the perpetrators of 
the July 7, 2005 London bombing plot, Mohammed Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, also attended 
training camps in Pakistan, again demonstrating how greatly contact with experienced al Qaeda 
operatives enhances the lethality of homegrown terrorists. See Daniel McGrory, Zahid Hussain & Karen 
McVeigh, Top al-Qaeda Trainer ‘Taught Suspects to Use Explosive’, TIMES (London), Aug. 12, 2006, 
available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article606838.ece. 
 29. See ANTHONY DWORKIN, Beyond the “War on Terror”: Towards a New Transatlantic 
Framework for Counterterrorism 2 (May 2009) (Eur. Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief), 
available at http://ecfr.eu/page/-/documents/ECFR_counterterrorism_brief.pdf (“Americans see 
terrorism primarily as an external threat, while for European societies it has a large internal 
dimension.”). 
 30. See Rid & Hecker, supra note 20, at 16-17. 
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as a “war,” while its European partners view it through the prism of law 
enforcement.31 But these differences in threat assessment may be 
narrowing. David Kilcullen, a renowned Australian terrorism expert, notes, 
“[c]ontrary to popular belief, most terrorist incidents on European soil since 
9/11 have not been purely home-grown, but have drawn on sponsorship, 
support or guidance from” al Qaeda.32 Meanwhile, senior U.S. government 
officials have acknowledged that, in view of the spate of terrorism plots 
uncovered inside the United States in 2009,33 “home-based terrorism” and 
violent radicalization of citizens are no longer primarily European 
concerns.34 
Nonetheless, insofar as both views command support in the 
counterterrorism community, these two poles provide useful alternative 
lenses for assessing the implications of the variability of terrorist threats.35 
Projecting legal debates through these competing threat lenses reveals 
different sets of inferences about law of armed conflict evolution and its 
merits. 
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR JUS AD BELLUM 
Many states and scholars would agree that non-state terrorist attacks 
(or, perhaps, threats of terrorist attacks) may give rise to a right of armed 
self-defense, and that the right of self-defense may include authority to use 
force against terrorist targets, or even against a harboring state.36 The big 
 
 31. See Jeremy Shapiro & Daniel Byman, Bridging the Transatlantic Counterterrorism Gap, 
WASH. Q., Autumn 2006, at 33, 43-44; Waxman, Fighting al-Qaeda, supra note 11, at 64. 
 32. David J. Kilcullen, Subversion and Countersubversion in the Campaign Against Terrorism in 
Europe, 30 STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 647, 649 (2007). 
 33. See MITCHELL SIBLER & ARVIN BHATT, N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: 
THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 5 (2007) (“Rather than being directed from al-Qaeda abroad,” the 
Department’s report argued, echoing Sageman, that post-9/11 plots against the West had “been 
conceptualized and planned by ‘unremarkable’ local residents/citizens who sought to attack their 
country of residence, utilizing al-Qaeda as their inspiration and ideological reference point.”). 
 34. Sebastian Rotella, U.S. Sees Homegrown Muslim Extremism as Rising Threat, L.A. 
TIMES,Dec. 7, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/07/nation/la-na-us-
radicalization7-2009dec07 (quoting Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano); see DANIEL 
BYMAN, DEADLY CONNECTIONS: STATES THAT SPONSOR TERRORISM 187-88 (2005). 
 35. See Kim Cragin, Cross-Cutting Observations and Some Implications for Policymakers, in 
SOCIAL SCIENCE FOR COUNTERTERRORISM: PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER, supra note 13, at 367, 
373-76 (discussing points of agreement and disagreement, and their policy implications, among those 
who think of terrorism in terms of organizations versus networks). 
 36. See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) (condemning 9/11 attacks and 
“[r]ecognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the [UN] 
Charter”); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (reaffirming same); Sean D. 
Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 41, 51 (2002) (“viewing the September 11 incidents as constituting an armed attack is fully 
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debate is over what set of conditions give rise to these authorities. For that 
debate to be of much practical significance, however, it ought to engage 
more deeply the nature and configuration of terrorist threats and the degree 
to which past events are indicative of future conflicts. 
One branch of this use of force question concerns under what 
conditions a non-state terrorism threat gives rise to a right of self-defense 
against a state. For example, one position is that a right to use force against 
a state arises from the actions of a terrorist group only when the state is 
tightly interwoven with or otherwise exercises effective control over that 
group—a similar standard to that embraced by the International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”) in a 1986 case involving alleged Nicaraguan and U.S. 
support for rebel groups in Central American states.37 Even under this 
narrow view, the use of force against Taliban-governed Afghanistan in 
2001 could be justified because the Taliban regime and al Qaeda were so 
closely intertwined.38  
Other positions include that the use of force against a state is 
permitted even when a state only provides some lower threshold of support 
 
consistent with the animating principle of Article 51, which was to allow states to exercise an inherent 
right to respond to acts that strike at the heart of a state’s national security”); see also Ian Johnstone, 
The Plea of “Necessity” in International Legal Discourse: Humanitarian Intervention and Counter-
terrorism, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 337, 368-69 (acknowledging reasons for denying the 
applicability of self-defense to actions against terrorists on the territory of a state from whom they do 
not receive support); Mark Drumbl et al., Self-Defense in an Age of Terrorism, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 141 (2003) (presenting how several I.L. scholars consider the jus ad bellum implications of the 
response to the 9/11 attacks, including the lawfulness of the U.S. response, and anticipatory and 
preemptive self-defense generally). But see Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 138 (July 9) (arguing that Article 51 
is not triggered to give Israel a self-defense claim because Palestinian attacks are not imputable to a 
State, and the threat originates from territory on which Israel itself exercises control); Jonathan L. 
Charney, The Use of Force Against Terrorism and International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 835 (2001) 
(arguing that the U.S. should have sought Security Council authorization before using force against the 
Taliban). 
 37. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 102-04 (June 
27); see also MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSIGHTS 
FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT 182-86 (2008) (discussing legal standard and 
basis for specific military actions undertaken by the United States, United Kingdom, Iran, Turkey, and 
Ethiopia in response to terrorist attacks); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 120 
(July 15, 1999) (holding that for acts of “armed bands of irregulars or rebels” to be attributed to a State 
“it is sufficient to require that the group as a whole be under the overall control of the State”). 
 38. See BYMAN, supra note 34, at 187-88 (“[F]rom May 1996 until the end of . . . 2001, al-Qa’ida 
was based in Afghanistan and enjoyed tremendous support from the ruling Taliban regime there. . . . By 
any sensible definition of state sponsorship, the Taliban’s Afghanistan qualifies as a highly energetic 
and enthusiastic sponsor.”); NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 125 (2004) (“Relations between Bin Ladin and the Taliban leadership were 
sometimes tense, but the foundation was deep and personal. Indeed, Mullah Omar had executed at least 
one subordinate who opposed his pro-Bin Ladin policy.”) [hereinafter THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT]. 
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for a non-state terrorist organization, the most extreme version of which 
would hold that the mere extended presence of a terrorist organization on a 
state’s soil could cross that threshold by constituting passive support.39 
However, some might draw a distinction between attacks against a state 
itself and a right to act against a terrorist group’s agents and infrastructure 
on the territory of a state, when a state fails to take sufficient steps to 
prevent terrorism threats from growing or operating within its borders.40 
Along similar lines, once self-defense has been lawfully invoked, a state 
might also assert a right to strike enemy terrorist agents sheltered in neutral 
territory if the neutral state is unable or unwilling to neutralize them.41 
Once such theories are put into practice, whether self-defensive rights 
of force extend to targets within a state or to a state itself ought to depend 
in part on the specific functional relationship between the terrorism danger 
and the activities (or non-activities) of a “host” state. What type of 
support—active or passive42—contributes significantly to the probability or 
intensity of threat? Answers to that question turn on assumptions about 
how terrorist entities organize to wage violence. At the same time, a “host” 
state’s capacity to neutralize terrorism threats will often depend heavily on 
how a terrorist entity or set of entities combine organizationally. For 
example, intelligence gathering or financial crackdowns may be more 
easily targeted at terrorist networks with strong interrelationships than at 
loosely affiliated ones. Again, a critical inquiry becomes how consequential 
is a state’s action or inaction to mitigating the quantum of threat faced by 
 
 39. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND 
ARMED ATTACKS 57-59 (2002) (discussing 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon to combat the PLO and 
international criticism of Israel’s legal position); Steven R. Ratner, Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello 
After September 11, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 905, 908 (2002) (arguing “none of the tests . . . [used by the ICJ, 
ICTY, or ILC to establish state responsibility] . . . supports the harboring theory of the United States” 
on the use of force in self-defense in response to the 9/11 attacks) (alteration in original). 
 40. See Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, And Beyond, 
35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 533 (2002) (concluding use of military force against bin Laden and followers in 
Afghanistan is legitimate self-defense under international law); see also TAL BECKER, TERRORISM AND 
THE STATE: RETHINKING THE RULES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 285-360 (2006) (discussing causation); 
Robert Barnidge, The Due Diligence Principle Under International Law, 8 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 
81 (2006) (examining the responsibility of states and state actors, focusing on the due diligence 
principle). 
 41. See David W. Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating al Qaeda within the Law of War, 51 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 1017-18 (2009). But see Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, ¶¶ 141-153 (Dec. 19) (rejecting similar self-defense 
claims). 
 42. See BYMAN, supra note 34, at 219 (noting “great[] contribution a state can make to a 
terrorist’s cause [by] not act[ing] against it,” including not policing borders, permitting fundraising, and 
allowing recruitment). 
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other states, the answers to which rest on assumptions about how the 
enemy or threat is organizationally constituted.  
If one believes that the main terrorism threats emanate from territorial 
sanctuaries that allow for operational planning, training, etc. (as top-down 
assessment proponents do), then even passive failure to eradicate terrorist 
havens is more reasonably viewed as an essential facilitating factor.43 
Centralized or tightly coordinated structures are assumed to be crucial to 
conducting large-scale or widespread violence, and to represent 
vulnerabilities to counter-terrorism efforts. This might suggest that merely 
allowing terrorist groups to operate from one’s sovereign territory should 
be weighted more heavily in assessing state responsibility for terrorist 
attacks.44 
If, on the other hand, one believes that territory and fixed bases are 
largely incidental to the operations and lethality of global terrorist 
networks, or if one believes that terrorist threats are decentralizing (as 
bottom-up assessment proponents do), then one would likely be skeptical 
that a state’s failure to prevent terrorist extremists (even those who self-
identify with violent activities abroad) from operating within its territory 
should factor significantly in international self-defense analysis. A terrorist 
threat’s structural fluidity or deconcentration may be the source of its 
strength and resilience. One would then worry that extending self-defense 
rights against states that merely fail to eradicate terrorists from operating 
within their borders would unnecessarily grant radically expansive license 
to use force. (Of course, though, even terrorism experts who contend that 
territorial sanctuaries are becoming less important to terrorism threats 
might acknowledge that the diminishment of this threat is attributable to 
 
 43. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 36, ¶ 2(a) (deciding that all States shall “[r]efrain from 
providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts”); see 
also BYMAN, supra note 34, at 54 (“[A] haven is often the most important form of assistance a state can 
provide . . . .”). This raises the question of what degree of sanctuary would suffice. As Byman notes, 
“[a] haven may involve allowing one of two operatives to find shelter . . . or it may include allowing a 
group to run dozens of training camps and a massive recruitment center. Thus, judgments on the scope 
and importance of state support must weigh both the type and degree of support given.” Id. 
 44. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 36, ¶ 2(d) (deciding that all States shall “[p]revent those who 
finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes 
against other States or their citizens”); see also Stephanie Barbour & Zoe Salzman, ‘The Tangled Web’: 
The Right of Self-Defense Against Non-State Actors in the Armed Activities Case, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 
& POL. 53 (2008); Michael D. Banks, Addressing State (Ir-)responsibility: The Use of Military Force as 
Self-Defense in International Counterterrorism Operations, 200 MIL. L. REV. 54 (2009) (identifying 
requirements for such a terrorist threat to trigger self-defense right under Article 51 of UN Charter); 
Vincent-Joël Proulx, Babysitting Terrorists: Should States be Strictly Liable for Failing to Prevent 
Transborder Attacks?, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 615 (2005) (discussing shift from standard model of 
state responsibility to “indirect responsibility” or “strict liability” for failing to prevent terrorist attacks 
originating on one’s territory and proposing strict liability model). 
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past self-defensive force that has been used to strike at terrorist groups in 
those sanctuaries).45 
Another way of framing the self-defense question—assuming that a 
non-state terrorist attack or threat may give rise to authority to use force 
against the responsible terrorist actor on the territory of another state—
concerns the geographic scope of that self-defense. If the non-state terrorist 
threat is internationally dispersed, how far does self-defense authority 
extend? Answering these questions depends again on some critical 
assumptions about the organizational structure of transnational terrorist 
threats.46 
A major issue is one of aggregation: to the extent that a non-state 
terrorist actor conducts its operations, including planning, in geographically 
dispersed locales by groups or cells, what functional relationships among 
those sub-entities ought legally to tie them together for the purposes of self-
defense analysis? Is common ideology enough to say that a right of self-
defense against some is a right of self-defense against all?47 Must they be 
part of a single command structure? Or are operational links—say 
exchanging information, common training, or sharing resources—sufficient 
for the right of self-defense against one group to extend to another? If the 
law of self-defensive force is fundamentally about responding to actual or 
imminent threats, then the answers to these theoretical questions ought to 
turn heavily on empirical understanding of the terrorist enemy and how it 
acquires and expands its lethality and reach, which are questions that the 
counter-terrorism community is debating and re-assessing. 
Take, for example, the U.S. position as articulated by then-State 
Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger in 2006: 
 
 45. See LEADERLESS JIHAD, supra note 22, at 19 (“Because he has been hiding full time, Osama 
bin Laden has not been able to appoint and train a new group of top leaders . . . In the past five years, al 
Qaeda has not been able for the most part to incorporate new recruits among its ranks. . . . Meanwhile, 
the success of the predator drone strike campaign on the Pakistani border has dramatically thinned the 
ranks of both al Qaeda leaders and cadres.”); Douglas Frantz et al., The New Face of Al Qaeda: Al 
Qaeda Seen as Wider Threat, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2004, at A1, available at http:// 
www.globalissues.org/article/512/the-new-face-of-al-qaeda. 
 46. See generally Brian A. Jackson, Organizational Decisionmaking by Terrorist Groups, in 
SOCIAL SCIENCE FOR COUNTERTERRORISM: PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER, supra note 13, at 209; 
Christopher Paul, How Do Terrorists Generate and Maintain Support, in SOCIAL SCIENCE FOR 
COUNTERTERRORISM: PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER, supra note 13, at 113. 
 47. Cf. Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, in 
LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 346, 380-81 (Wittes ed., 2009) 
(suggesting that cases of self-defense might include the targeted killing “of radical imams who are 
operationally part of al Qaeda”). 
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There is no principle of international law that limits a state’s ability to 
act in self-defense to a single territory, when the threat comes from 
areas outside that territory as well. . . . As a practical matter . . . a state 
must be responsible for preventing terrorists from using its territory as 
a base for launching attacks. And, as a legal matter, where a state is 
unwilling or unable to do so, it may be lawful for the targeted state to 
use military force in self-defense to address that threat.48 
That view, which “extend[s] the boundaries of the conflict to take in al-
Qaeda’s operations around the world,” has essentially been maintained by 
the Obama administration and is a source of tension between the United 
States and Europe.49 According to current State Department Legal Advisor 
Harold Koh, “whether a particular individual will be targeted in a particular 
location will depend upon considerations specific to each case, including 
those related to the imminence of the threat, the sovereignty of the other 
states involved, and the willingness and ability of those states to suppress 
the threat the target poses.”50 The United States might believe that its right 
to use armed force in self-defense in response to 9/11 extends to strikes 
against al Qaeda operatives on Pakistani territory, when Pakistani forces 
are incapable of reaching terrorists, since it has been conducting Predator 
drone strikes under those very conditions (I say “might” because the United 
States does not publicly acknowledge these strikes outside Afghanistan and 
the Pakistani government often denounces them).51 It also may hold that the 
functional linkages between the Pakistani Taliban and al Qaeda and the 
Afghan Taliban suffice to extend this justification to the Pakistani 
Taliban52—a position not embraced by European allies53—and may have 
based reported strikes against affiliated militants in Yemen, Somalia, and 
Syria on similar grounds.54 
These examples help highlight how the debate about the structure of 
future terrorism threats has several implications for jus ad bellum legal 
debates about the reach of self-defensive force—debates which tend to 
refer generically to transnational “terrorist threats.” First, the structural 
heterogeneity of transnational terrorist threats means the development of 
 
 48. Bellinger, supra note 1, at 739. 
 49. See Dworkin, supra note 1, at 5. 
 50. Koh Remarks, supra note 3. 
 51. See Jane Perlez & Pir Zubair Shah, Drones Batter Al Qaeda and Its Allies Within Pakistan, 
N.Y. TIMES, April 4, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/05/world/asia/05drones.html. 
 52. See infra notes 70-73 (discussing Predator drone strikes on Pakistani soil, including against 
Pakistani Taliban). 
 53. See Nigel Inkster & Robert Whalley, Law and Order, 51 SURVIVAL 55, 59 (2009). 
 54. See Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, Officials Say U.S. Killed an Iraqi in Raid in Syria, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/28/world/middleeast/28syria.html. 
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customary international law on the use of force in self-defense against 
“terrorism” or even “state-sponsored terrorism” is likely to be slow and 
methodologically more challenging than typical interstate issues. In 
interpreting state-state interactions, the notion of sovereign equality 
supplies the working assumption that all states share basic attributes of 
agency and coherence, which makes analogizing to prior fact patterns more 
straightforward. These assumptions do not hold with respect to non-state 
terrorist groups, placing on those seeking to rely on past cases the burden 
of demonstrating that the groups or threats involved were similar with 
respect to legally salient characteristics. Consistent interpretations of state 
practice in response to terrorist acts will be especially hard to come by, 
since interpreters may hold divergent views of the basic structural attributes 
of the antagonist actor involved. Thus, the accretion of customary 
international law in this area is likely to be especially slow and even more 
heavily disputed than in other areas of use of force doctrine. 
Second, if the purpose of jus ad bellum doctrine is to constrain 
aggression and destabilizing militarism while permitting states sufficient 
latitude to protect themselves from actual or imminent threats, then 
proposed legal-doctrinal reforms based on misjudgments about the nature 
of terrorism threats carry systemic risks. An adaptation of legal doctrine 
that widens the territorial reach of self-defense rights or lowers the 
threshold for authorizing attacks on terrorist targets within states based on 
exaggerated assessment of terrorist entities’ functional linkages risks 
exposing the international system to too much force. A resistance to 
adaptation that clings to narrow territorial reach and high thresholds based 
on underestimating the functional linkages among dispersed terrorist 
entities risks undercutting states’ authority to defend themselves against 
hostile entities that transcend state or even continental borders. 
This discussion so far has argued that the nature and structure of 
terrorist threats should affect evolution of the law of armed force, but there 
may be causal implications in the other direction: legal doctrine may affect 
evolution of the nature and structure of terrorist threats. This article alluded 
to the possibility that a legal theory permissive of military strikes against 
terrorist sanctuaries may have contributed to the dispersal and 
decentralization of al Qaeda since 2001.55 On the other hand, a legal 
construct that depends on aggregating related groups under the umbrella of 
an overarching “terrorist enemy” may also damage the overall 
counterterrorism effort by playing into their propaganda strategy of 
ideological unification. Strategists concerned primarily with decentralized 
 
 55. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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or bottom-up terrorist threats argue that states should aim to “disaggregate 
and to differentiate between such groups,” and “to highlight and exploit 
disparities, not to ignore them or even help remove them.”56 This is 
especially relevant in the case of al Qaeda, which explicitly seeks to 
aggregate local grievances into a single violent campaign.57 That is, a self-
defense legal theory that aggregates dispersed threats may be inadvertently 
assisting militant groups whose strategy depends on portraying and 
publicizing a common banner. 
One might respond to this jus ad bellum analysis by saying the top-
down versus bottom-up debate is a false choice. Terrorist threats fitting 
either model co-exist, as do many threats in between. Indeed, that is 
precisely the cautionary point: pegging legal reform to a static prediction 
about the structure and operation of non-state groups risks constructing a 
rigid legal architecture on a shifting or fleeting set of strategic exigencies. 
From a normative standpoint, a key question is whether it is better to 
work toward articulating specific jus ad bellum tests or conditions with 
respect to “host” states or to rely on flexible standards to govern resort to 
force against terrorist agents or assets operating within another’s sovereign 
territory. The answer turns in part on how organizational adaptation of 
terrorist movements affects their destructive potential. 
On the one hand, reliance on the general principles of necessity and 
proportionality may ultimately offer a more stable limitation to self-defense 
authority (or, for that matter, a more stable set of criteria to guide UN 
Security Council deliberations) than a set of brighter-line rules pertaining 
to non-state threats. The ICJ’s “effective control” test, for example, may 
have been a fair attempt to articulate a requirement that struck a general 
balance suited for civil wars and local rebellions spilling across borders 
(though I am doubtful even of that). But the rapid and continuing evolution 
of contemporary non-state entities could render such inflexible legal rules 
 
 56. See Rid & Hecker, supra note 20, at 19. 
 57. See Scott Shane, A Year of Terror Plots, Through a Second Prism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2010, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/13/us/13intel.html (quoting National War College 
terrorism expert Audrey Kurth Cronin: “The proper response is to stop calling all these plots ‘Al Qaeda’ 
. . . We’re inadvertently building up the brand”); see also David Kilcullen, Subversion and 
Countersubversion in the Campaign against Terrorism in Europe, 30 STUD. IN CONFLICT & 
TERRORISM 647, 660 (2007) (aggregating all linked groups into the “enemy” camp can be 
counterproductive; “[a] well-targeted, discriminating response that distinguishes between terrorism, 
subversion, and mere radicalism, and neither overstates nor ignores the threat is indispensable.”); David 
Miliband, U.K. Sec’y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, After Mumbai, Beyond the War 
on Terror, Address made at Taj Hotel in Mumbai, India (Jan. 15, 2009), in http:// 
davidmiliband.info/speeches/speeches_09_01a.htm (“The more we lump terrorist groups together and 
draw the battle lines as a simple binary struggle between moderates and extremists or good and evil, the 
more we play into the hands of those seeking to unify groups with little in common . . . .”). 
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obsolete in short order if they fail to meet security imperatives. On the 
other hand, reliance on general principles and standards lacks clarity and 
easy application in any particular instance, and risks loosening of general 
constraints on military force and its dangerous spillover effects. The 
balance between these competing risks depends heavily on the extent to 
which terrorist threats take different and varying structural forms and the 
extent to which that structural form is tied to terrorist effectiveness. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR JUS IN BELLO 
A flexible approach to self-defense—or a recognition that multiple 
forms of transnational terrorism threats exist side by side and may produce 
very different self-defense analyses also existing side by side—would 
obviate the need to settle one way or another the debate about how the most 
potent terrorist threats are generally structured. Presuming, however, that 
the decision is made to treat a specific terrorist threat contingency as an 
armed conflict, and the analysis moves to jus in bello questions, applying 
law of armed conflict rules and standards still requires difficult judgments 
about the organizational structure of the adversary. 
Similar questions of legal aggregation discussed above in the context 
of self-defense and the recourse to force may also be determinative in 
considering the appropriate outer bounds of military conduct under the law 
of armed conflict. If one believes that the law of armed conflict may be an 
appropriate framework for regulating counterterrorism operations—
including capture and detention of or use of lethal force against enemy 
terrorist agents—a key question then becomes the substantive scope of that 
authority: against which individuals and under what circumstances does it 
apply, and what does it permit a state to do against them? Again, many 
efforts to answer these questions have treated terrorist organizations as a 
monolithic category. This discussion should take a step back to understand 
more fully the range of terrorist threats and the degree to which underlying 
assumptions of law of armed conflict models fit or do not fit the structural 
characteristics of continuing or emerging terrorism threats. 
One major school of thought, advocated by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), holds that lethal military force is 
authorized only against military personnel or those civilians engaging in 
“direct participation in hostilities.”58 Applied to terrorism threats, this 
 
 58. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, Adopted by the Assembly of the Int’l Comm. of the 
Red Cross on 26 Feb. 2009 ¶12 Vol.90/ No. 872 (Dec. 2008.) (prepared by Nils Melzer). See also 
Daphné Richemond, Transnational Terrorist Organizations and the Use of Force, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 
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standard then raises the questions of how to define “hostilities” and what it 
means to “participate directly” in them. Constrictive interpretations of this 
standard have come under criticism from the United States and others who 
view it as poorly adapted to the nature of terrorist operations and 
insufficiently respectful of military necessity.59 
In a March 2009 federal court filing in the detention context, the 
Obama administration proposed a flexible standard for the substantive 
extent of its law of war authority in its armed conflict with al Qaida and its 
allies.60 Falling under the asserted detention authority were persons “who 
were ‘part of,’ or who provided ‘substantial support’ to, al-Qaida or 
Taliban forces and ‘associated forces’” that are engaged in hostilities 
against the United States or its coalition partners61—a standard similar to 
that used by the Bush administration.62 The memorandum noted the 
difficulty of drawing clear lines, stating that “[i]t is neither possible nor 
advisable . . . to attempt to identify, in the abstract, the precise nature and 
degree of ‘substantial support,’ or the precise characteristics of ‘associated 
forces,’ that are or would be sufficient to bring persons and organizations 
within the foregoing framework.”63 Both the ICRC approach and this U.S. 
government standard involve implicit assumptions about how the adversary 
is structured and organized to wage violence.64 
 
1001, 1017-27 (2007) (discussing the “inadequacy of the civilian/combatant distinction,” the difficulty 
posed by the concept of “direct participation in hostilities,” and the problem of the lack of reciprocity). 
 59. See Shane Harris, Are Drone Strikes Murder?, NAT’L J., Jan. 9, 2010, at 21, 24. 
 60. Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to 
Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442 
(TFH) (D.D.C. March 13, 2009) [hereinafter DOJ Guantanamo Memorandum]; see also Koh Remarks, 
supra note 3 (“Both in our internal decisions about specific Guantanamo detainees, and before the 
courts in habeas cases, we have interpreted the scope of detention authority authorized by Congress in 
the AUMF as informed by the laws of war.”) (italics in original). 
 61. DOJ Guantanamo Memorandum, supra note 60, at 3. 
 62. See William Glaberson, U.S. Won’t Label Terror Suspects as ‘Combatants’, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
14, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/us/politics/14gitmo.html (quoting former 
Bush administration lawyer Steven Engel). 
 63. DOJ Guantanamo Memorandum, supra note 60, at 2. 
 64. See Koh Remarks, supra note 3: 
[W]e have based our authority to detain . . . on whether the factual record in the particular 
case meets the legal standard. This includes, but is not limited to, whether an individual 
joined with or became part of al Qaeda or Taliban forces, which can be demonstrated by 
relevant evidence of formal or functional membership, which may include an oath of loyalty, 
training with al Qaeda, or taking positions with enemy forces. Often these factors operate in 
combination. While we disagree with the International Committee of the Red Cross on some 
of the particulars, our general approach of looking at “functional” membership in an armed 
group has been endorsed not only by the federal courts, but also is consistent with the 
approach taken in the targeting context by the ICRC in its recent study on Direct Participation 
in Hostilities (DPH). 
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Whereas jus ad bellum is fundamentally about promoting peaceful 
resolution of conflicts and balancing restraints on aggression with 
legitimate self-defense, jus in bello is about balancing protection of 
humanitarian or liberty values with military necessity.65 Specific rules of 
the law of armed conflict historically derived from generalizable features of 
warfare premised heavily on hierarchically-organized antagonists that 
exercise some control over constituent agents. For example, it permits 
capture and detention of enemy fighters for the duration of hostilities, 
because it can generally be assumed that incapacitating individual members 
of the enemy organization diminishes its fighting capacity and until the war 
ends it may be assumed that released capturees would likely return to the 
fight; releasing them at the end of hostilities is generally low-risk under the 
premise that their commanders would no longer send them to fight. 
Concepts of “membership” or “on behalf of” are often—though not 
always—easy to apply in conventional warfare, and can be 
straightforwardly analogized in conflict against a terrorist enemy that 
shares basic attributes of unified command or war effort. When those basic 
assumptions fray, however, so do the balances struck in law of armed 
conflict doctrine. 
Jus in bello debates concerning counter-terrorism cannot be divorced 
from analysis of underlying strategic context that in turn incorporates a 
nuanced understanding of enemy structure. Two examples highlight the 
difficulty of applying or adapting the law of armed conflict to military 
operations absent a firm understanding of the enemy threat’s structure: 
targeting and detention. 
A. Targeting 
The CIA’s Predator drone program presents a stark example of the 
conceptual challenges posed by applying law of war targeting standards to 
global terrorist networks. Since President Obama’s inauguration, the U.S. 
government has reportedly expanded the American drone warfare 
program.66 Kenneth Anderson writes that “U.S. officials seem to believe 
that by adhering to IHL’s [International Humanitarian Law] formal, 
technical definition of ‘combatant’ to select a lawful target they have done 
 
 65. See Gabriella Blum, The Laws of War and the "Lesser Evil”, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 7-9 
(2010). 
 66. See Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What are the Risks of the C.I.A.’s Covert Drone 
Program?, NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009; Scott Shane, C.I.A. to Expand Use of Drones in Pakistan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/04/world/asia/04drones.html 
(discussing CIA drone strikes in Pakistani tribal areas). 
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an especially good and rigorous parsing of the legal requirements.”67 
“[T]he international law community,” however, considers this approach to 
be “a relaxation of the ordinary standard of international human rights law, 
including prohibitions on murder and extrajudicial killing.”68 Unlike 
detention, for which litigation has produced detailed public elaboration of 
the government’s legal standards, the drone program is shrouded in 
secrecy, though presumably targeting decisions are based on similar law of 
armed conflict standards in assessing who is or is not an enemy fighter.69 
What set of suspected facts about an individual or his conduct put him in 
the category against whom lethal force is authorized under the law of 
armed conflict? 
In a recent statement, for instance, State Department Legal Adviser 
Koh explained that the United States regards its legal authorities to include 
“lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-
level al Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks.”70 Underlying this 
statement is a critical assumption that al Qaeda has vertical echelons 
through which control or influence is exercised, and applying it in specific 
cases requires assessments about where and how targeted individuals fit 
within that order. 
The Israeli Supreme Court has addressed similar issues in the context 
of Israel’s policy of “targeted killing” of members of Palestinian terrorist 
groups.71 The Court noted that the applicable law is “the international law 
dealing with armed conflicts,”72 and that under the law of armed conflict 
“taking . . . part in hostilities” could include, in addition to bearing 
weapons, “gathering intelligence, or . . . preparing . . . for the hostilities.”73 
However, it recognized that the bounds of what constitutes taking a direct 
 
 67. Anderson, supra note 47, at 363. Anderson uses the IHL community’s reaction to the United 
States’ November 2002 Predator strike on a car occupied by al Qaeda operative Qaed Salim Sinan al-
Harethi—which a UN special rapporteur termed a “clear case of extrajudicial killing”—to highlight the 
gulf between the American and international humanitarian community’s views of this practice. Id. at 
362-63. 
 68. Id. at 363; see also Kretzmer, supra note 5, at 173 (“The Yemen attack by the US and the 
‘targeted killings’ by Israeli forces have been castigated by human rights NGOs, and some UN bodies 
as ‘extra-judicial executions’. The states involved argue, on the other hand, that the killings were 
legitimate acts of war . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
 69. See generally Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and 
Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (2008). 
 70. Koh Remarks, supra note 3. 
 71. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Palestinian Soc’y for the Prot. Of Human Rights 
and the Env’t v. Gov’t of Isr., [2006] IsrSC (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/ files_eng/ 
02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf. 
 72. Id. ¶ 21. 
 73. Id. ¶ 33. 
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part in hostilities—and during what time civilians committing eligible acts 
should be considered as sufficient to become legitimate targets—are 
ambiguous.74 
These examples highlight that a “participation in hostilities” 
assessment is complicated even when dealing with a highly centralized, 
hierarchical terrorist organization like “core” al Qaeda, Hamas, or 
Hezbollah; where the existing laws of armed conflict can at least provide 
some useful or stable guidance (though in the cases of Hamas and 
Hezbollah, the combination of military and civilian components creates 
another set of targeting law complexities75). A relatively easy-to-administer 
option is to focus on close analogues to membership in an “armed force” in 
state-state conflict.76 Indicia such as formal allegiance pledges or 
participation in common induction or training programs, for example, could 
be analogized and used to evaluate membership in hierarchical terrorist 
groups like al Qaeda.77 
Even if this were workable for a tightly structured adversary, such 
analysis is of little use in the context of a bottom-up threat emanating from 
loosely-affiliated radicals, who may share ideological inspiration but not an 
 
 74. Id. ¶ 34-40. See also Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting and International Humanitarian Law in 
Afghanistan, in 85 U.S. NAVAL WAR C. INT’L L. STUD: THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 307, 318 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2009) (discussing how irregular combatancy confounds 
the limitation that persons not members of an armed force, but who directly participate in hostilities, 
may only be targeted for such time as they are doing so). Schmitt notes the ICRC position (based on 
Article 51.3 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which the U.S. has not ratified) that a 
civilian who participates in hostilities regains the protections accorded civilians by IHL at times when 
he is not doing so, and the criticism that this creates a “‘revolving door’ through which the direct 
participant passes as he or she begins and completes each mission.” Id. Schmitt prefers an “opt-in/opt-
out” approach which “locks the door” once a civilian chooses to “opt-in” to hostilities; he may only 
“opt-out” again by an affirmative act of withdrawal, or an extended period of noninvolvement. While 
this is vaguer, Schmitt believes that the latter approach better balances military necessity and 
humanitarian concerns. 
 75. See Moshe Halbertal, The Goldstone Illusion, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 6, 2009, available at 
http://www.tnr.com/article/world/the-goldstone-illusion. 
 76. See Schmitt, supra note 74, at 314 (noting principle of distinction, when confronting a 
uniformed enemy, clarifies who may be attacked and who may not: “[f]or instance, an unarmed cook 
may be attacked on sight if he or she is a member of the armed forces”). 
 77. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 151-52, 155, 166 (noting pledges of 
fealty given by various terrorist operatives to Jemaa Islamiya and al Qaeda). The U.S. Government’s 
March 2009 Guantanamo litigation memorandum also discusses formal and functional membership 
constructs, but without taking a strong position on their utility or discussing their limits; see DOJ 
Guantanamo Memorandum, supra note 61, at 6-7; see also Al-Bihani v. Obama, No. 09-5051, at 11 
(D.C. Cir. 2009), available at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/dc/095051p.pdf (“While we 
think the facts of this case show Al-Bihani was both part of and substantially supported enemy forces, 
we realize the picture may be less clear in other cases where facts may indicate only support, only 
membership, or neither. We have no occasion here to explore the outer bounds of what constitutes 
sufficient support or indicia of membership to meet the detention standard.”). 
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organizational or operational infrastructure. As new terrorist actors emerge 
who are “less and less directly tied in a ‘corporate’ sense to al Qaeda,” the 
claim of affiliation risks becoming a “mere legalism in order to bring them 
under the umbrella of the [Authorization for the Use of Military Force]” 
and within the set of legitimate targets under the law of armed conflict.78 In 
this scenario, the traditional law of armed conflict criterion—
“membership” in an armed force—does not provide useful guidance, since 
even the minimum requirement of having an institutionalized or stable 
command structure is absent.79 
Further complicating this assessment is the possibility—if not the 
certainty—that al Qaeda or virtually any major non-state threat is, at any 
given moment, a hybrid incorporating elements of both organizational 
models. The relative weight of top-down and bottom-up features in this 
mixture may vary as operational conditions change. The most acute legal 
challenges might arise in situations where a grouping of terrorist 
individuals or entities has sufficient coordination to sustain an intense 
campaign of violence, but not so much coordination that states can clearly 
identify their contours as a single enemy organization. The issue becomes 
not simply what an individual is doing, but on whose behalf he is doing it, 
or what relation those activities bear to what other individuals are doing. 
If a command hierarchy is lacking, perhaps other types of linkages 
might suffice to justify coercive force. The ICRC acknowledges in its 
analysis of direct participation in hostilities that lack of clear and formal 
hierarchies and affiliations among non-state actor agents means that in 
some contexts “membership must depend on whether the continuous 
function assumed by an individual corresponds to that collectively 
exercised by the group as a whole, namely the conduct of hostilities on 
behalf of a non-State party to the conflict.”80 But when applied to terrorist 
“parties” this may raise more questions than it answers. If terrorists teach 
and learn tradecraft and bombmaking over the Internet, could repeatedly 
counseling fellow associates on these topics, or even posting designs on 
 
 78. Anderson, supra note 47, at 389. Anderson argues that “self-defense,” not international 
humanitarian law targeting standards, provides the right legal framework for targeting decisions. 
 79. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva 
Convention), art. 4(2)(a) Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva 
Convention] (extending POW status to “[m]embers of other militias and members of other volunteer 
corps, including those of organized resistance movements” as long as they fulfill four conditions, 
including being “commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.”). 
 80. See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 58, at 33; see also id. at 25 (“Membership in 
irregular armed forces, such as militias, volunteer corps, or resistance movements belonging to a party 
to the conflict, generally . . . can only be reliably determined on the basis of functional criteria, such as 
those applying to organized armed groups in non-international armed conflict.”). 
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jihadist websites, constitute substantial support sufficient to justify lethal 
force? If ideological inspiration from afar is a key trigger for “homegrown 
jihadist” attacks, could inciting or encouraging attacks over the Internet 
reasonably be considered “taking a direct part in hostilities”?81 Some of the 
risks to rights posed by expansive interpretations are obvious, and similar 
questions arise also in state-state conventional warfare (take, for example, 
NATO’s controversial 1999 air bombardment of Serbian television and 
radio transmission facilities, which NATO argued were integral to 
sustaining Serbian Army operations with propaganda82). But if one believes 
that military force is necessary and proportionate self-defense against a 
terrorist enemy, there are also security risks to overly narrow approaches to 
combatancy, and it is difficult to strike an appropriate balance in the 
abstract without considering the way actors organize to wage war. 
B. Detention 
 To the extent that the law of war is applicable to conflicts against 
terrorist groups and constituent agents can be held as enemy fighters,83 
many would agree that interpretation and application of its detention rules 
still require some adaptation. Precisely what modifications are necessary, 
however, depends in large part on how analysts understand and 
conceptualize the threat—as a unitary, consolidated actor, or as 
 
 81. See Sudarsan Raghavan, Cleric Says He was Confidant to Hasan, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 
2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/15/ 
AR2009111503160.html (describing Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan’s relationship with Yemeni cleric 
Anwar al-Aulaqi). 
 82. A spokesman for Supreme Allied Commander Wesley Clark at one point declared that “Serb 
radio and television is an instrument of propaganda and repression . . . . It has filled the airways with 
hate and with lies over the years, and especially now. It is therefore a legitimate target in this 
campaign.” Craig R. Whitney, Crisis in the Balkans: The Alliance; NATO’s Generals and Civilians 
Clash Over Bombing TV, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1999, at A8, available at http:// www.nytimes.com/ 
1999/04/09/world/crisis-balkans-alliance-nato-s-generals-civilians-clash-over-bombing-tv.html; see 
also Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L. L. 239, 276 (2000) 
(discussing the legality of the attacks on Serbian television stations); Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY, 
Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ¶¶ 71-79 (June 13, 2000), available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/otp_report_nato_bombing_en.pdf (discussing the legality of the 
attacks and recommending that the Office of the Prosecutor not commence an investigation related to 
the bombing). 
 83. See generally Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 48 (2009) (discussing various ways besides enemy combatancy the law of armed conflict might be 
interpreted to authorize and regulate detention of terrorist threats); Monica Hakimi, International 
Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects: Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict - Criminal Divide, 33 
YALE J. INT’L L. 369 (2008) (discussing legal debates about the appropriateness of law of war detention 
of terrorist threats). 
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ideologically-related but organizationally independent threats, or 
somewhere in between. 
For example, the law of armed conflict authorizes detention until the 
“cessation of hostilities,”84 but this temporal dimension of detention law is 
premised on the assumption that released enemy fighters, bound to the 
commands of their sovereign, will return to fight again as long as hostilities 
are ongoing.85 In traditional warfare, we assume a functioning principal-
agent relationship between fighters and a government: so long as a 
government (principal) is engaged in a war, its fighters (agents) presumably 
will be ordered to resume hostilities if available to do so. Moreover, 
detention is intended to speed the successful termination of hostilities.86 
These assumptions are obviously problematic in the context of a war 
against a terrorist organization, which is not likely to come to a definitive 
end and where the principal–agent relationships are unclear. As Justice 
O’Connor wrote for the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld: “If the 
practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the 
conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that 
understanding [that the AUMF includes the power to detain through the 
end of hostilities] may unravel.”87 The degree to which it may unravel, 
however, depends on the adversary’s makeup and internal constitution. 
Traditional bases for enemy prisoner detention might provide useful 
guidance to the extent that a particular organization is sufficiently coherent 
and could eventually be defeated in some meaningful sense (or its military 
 
 84. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 79, art. 118 (“Prisoners of war shall be released and 
repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”); see also Derek Jinks, The Declining 
Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 367, 375 (2004) (considering whether war on terror 
detainees are protected by the Third Geneva Convention and concluding that “denying detainees POW 
status has no significant protective consequences, and, as a consequence, yields no important policy 
advantages to the detaining state”). 
 85. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 772-73 (1950) (“The alien enemy is bound by an 
allegiance which commits him to lose no opportunity to forward the cause of our enemy; hence the 
United States, assuming him to be faithful to his allegiance, regards him as part of the enemy resources. 
It therefore takes measures to disable him from commission of hostile acts imputed as his intention 
because they are a duty to his sovereign.”). In the middle ages, knights released upon the payment of 
ransom could be “released on parole forbidding them to take part in hostilities against the captor until 
ransom was paid,” though the observance of such paroles rested on medieval notions of chivalry which, 
obviously, do not govern modern war, much less the conduct of terrorist groups. See ALLAN ROSAS, 
THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS OF WAR 47 (2005). 
 86. Cf. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of 
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29-Dec. 11, 1868 (“[T]he only legitimate 
object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the 
enemy; . . . for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men . . . .”), 
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/130?OpenDocument. 
 87. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004). 
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capacity sufficiently degraded to declare its defeat). For example, the 
recent demise of the Tamil Tigers, or LTTE, in Sri Lanka is a reminder that 
asymmetrical conflicts with non-state actors relying on terrorist tactics do 
sometimes find a decisive end.88 Terrorism scholars have studied the 
phenomenon of the termination of terrorist groups; their insights might help 
legal scholars adapt the principal-agent model of detention to wars against 
terrorist groups.89 
On the other hand, the more terrorist entities become decentralized, 
the more it makes sense to dispense with the principal-agent model 
altogether. One alternate model would assess continued detention authority 
on a case-by-case basis, essentially asking whether the conflict continues 
with respect to a particular, detained individual. As Curtis Bradley and Jack 
Goldsmith have noted, despite the fact that an end of the conflict with al 
Qaeda will be difficult to ascertain, “the functional justification under the 
laws of war for detention itself . . . to prevent the combatant from returning 
to the conflict” is still applicable.90 What Bradley and Goldsmith might 
discard is the “categorical, group-based” assumption that a captured 
terrorist will return to the fight as long as the group with which he affiliated 
remains engaged in hostilities.91 Instead, they propose substituting the 
 
 88. See C. Bryson Hull & Ranga Sirilal, Sri Lanka’s Long War Reaches Climax, Tigers Concede, 
REUTERS, May 17, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE54D1GR20090517; see 
generally, Gaga Gvineria, How Does Terrorism End?, in SOCIAL SCIENCE FOR COUNTERTERRORISM: 
PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER, supra note 13, at 257 (discussing processes and factors contributing to 
the decline of terrorist movements). 
 89. See, e.g., Shane, supra note 57; SETH G. JONES & MARTIN C. LIBICKI, HOW TERRORIST 
GROUPS END: LESSONS FOR COUNTERING AL QA’IDA (2008). 
 90. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L.R. 2047, 2124 (2004-2005). See also Glazier, supra note 41, at 1025 (arguing 
uncertainty about how length of conflict should not be dispositive, since “[n]o one has ever known how 
long a conflict would last ex ante”). Cf. Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to Al Qaeda, 56 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 759, 780 (2006-2007) (arguing that noncriminal detention of suspected terrorists captured in the 
West, away from areas of conventional armed conflict, is appropriately and sufficiently regulated by the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, which permits detention of “certain persons who are not POWs and are 
under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of a state . . . .”). The Fourth Geneva 
Convention approach, however, is subject to the same temporal limitations as traditional detention of 
enemy soldiers under the Third Geneva Convention, since the former also requires that “[i]nternment . . 
. cease as soon as possible after the close of hostilities.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) art. 133, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Such an approach still suffers from a) the difficulty of defining the end of an 
irregular problem, and b) the weakness of the assumption that ideological fanatics are loyal agents who 
will stand down when their principals do. 
 91. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 90, at 2124. See also Benjamin Wittes & Colleen A. 
Peppard, Designing Detention: A Model Law for Terrorist Incapacitation, THE BROOKINGS INST. 8, 
June 26, 2009, available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0626_detention 
_wittes/0626_detention_wittes.pdf (“Generally speaking, military detention is rooted in associational 
status with a particular enemy entity . . . . [C]reating a workable definition of the detainable class [for 
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question “whether hostilities have, in essence, ceased with the individual 
because he no longer poses a substantial danger of rejoining hostilities,” 
based on factors including “the detainee’s past conduct, level of authority 
within al Qaeda, statements and actions during confinement, age and 
health, and psychological profile.”92 Perhaps such an approach would 
effectively balance liberty and security, but again it is difficult to assess 
that claim independent of a view as to how the enemy is and will continue 
to be configured to wage war. 
CONCLUSION 
This article aimed not to provide definitive answers to questions 
arising out of the adaptation of the laws of war to conflicts against nonstate 
terrorist threats, but rather to reorient the discussion of legal adaptation in 
terms of debates about the future threat environment. Because of competing 
understandings of terrorist threats—and because of terrorist organizations’ 
mutability—legal consensus on widely applicable rules and standards will 
likely remain elusive. Different assumptions about the nature and shape of 
a terrorist threat affects both the choice of which legal framework to apply 
(i.e., whether law of armed conflict standards are appropriate at all in 
certain contexts) and the application of corresponding standards to 
particular individuals. 
One might conclude from all this that the difficulties of applying law 
of armed conflict approaches to complex, multifaceted terrorism threats 
point in favor of exclusive reliance on law enforcement and intelligence, 
governed by criminal law and human rights law, as the most workable of 
imperfect options. But although applying a “war” paradigm—especially 
one governed by flexible standards—to counter-terrorism operations carries 
significant risk in any particular campaign and systemic risk to legal 
constraints on armed force more generally, reliance on or construction of a 
legal regime poorly matched for strategic necessities will fail to balance 
competing values in the short-term and will prove unstable in the long-
term. 
Rather than constructing law of war principles universally applicable 
to “terrorism,” or even “transnational” or “state-supported” terrorism, this 
analysis generally points in favor of more context-sensitive legal 
adjustments that take account of structural features of particular, relevant 
actors. On the one hand, the need to incorporate into legal analysis a 
 
detention of captured terrorists] requires some degree of rethinking of the associational status and 
conduct-based detention models.”). 
 92. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 90, at 2125. 
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sophisticated understanding of terrorist organizational structure and 
evolution will mean that the process of legal adaptation will and should be 
slower than hoped for by those who seek legal clarity. On the other hand, 
however, doing so will yield a better fit of law and strategic necessity in 
ways that protect humanitarian and liberty values. 
 
